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This paper explores the detenninants of

long term career considerations? Do race and poverty

enlistment for a large sample of male youth drawn from the

have powerful independent effects on the probability

ABSTRACT.

National Longitudinal Survey of Youth.

Logit results indicate

that Ii young person will enlist? And, is the military an

that the probability of en1istment is directly related to minority

effective anti-poverty institution for both black and

and poverty ,tatus while controlling for ability and a number of
other socioeconomic background variables. In addition, an
analysis of poverty transitioRB show that a very Ia.rge percentage

white youth?

The purpose of this paper is to use a large sample

of enlistment age males drawn from the National

of enlistees in the early 19805 who were living in poverty at age

Longitudinal Survey of Youth to begin to address these

17 were successful in escaping poverty by 1990. An importsnt

questions.

conclusion is that the military can serve as a mechanism of
upward economic mobility for disadvantaged youth. (IlS, 124)

decision is developed and descriptive statistics are

I. Introduction

presented which indicate that white and black military
personnel enlist for similar reasons, although black

The racial and socioeconomic composition of the

enlistees show a slightly higher propensity to enlist for

military has long been of concern to social scientists
and editorialists.
during

the

short term economic reasons.

During the Gulf Conflict and earlier

Vietnam

representation

of

War,

for

blacks

example,

and

Second, logit regressions are run to test hypotheses

over

that the decision to enlist is directly related to minority

economically

status and poverty status at age 17. Finally, the effect
of enlistment on transitions into and out of poverty is

disadvantaged youth in the service caused genuine
concern that certain segments of the population suffer
disproportionately (Farris,

1992;

Galbraith,

explored. It is shown that a very large percentage of

1990;

enlistees who were living in poverty at age 17 and who

Janowitz and Moskos, Jr., 1974; Lacayo, 1990). But,

enlisted in the early 1980s were successful in escaping

during the 1980s, the absence of large-scale military
engagement

meant

that

over

representation

poverty by 1990.

of

employment opportunities in the 1990s is likely to

especially for those facing very depressed private

retard

sector job markets (Schexnider and Butler, 1976).
Most empirical work in the economic literature on
The focus is primarily on how enlistment

responds

to

changes

in

the

macro

similar

of

important

theoretical frameworks (Antel, Hosek and

Brorsen, 1989; and Hosek and Peterson, 1985).

On

the supply side, the potential enlistee is seen weighing

an institution affecting racial and income
number

youth,

Peterson, 1989; Daula and Smith, 1985; DeBoer and

and Klerman, 1992). Surprisingly little empirical work

A

poor

Much of the empirical work on enlistment is based on

Brown, 1985; Dale and Gilroy, 1983;

has been directed toward the economic role of the
as

progression of

n. Reasons for Enlistment

economy,

Deboer and Brorsen, 1989; Horne, 1985; and Hosek

military

economic

have used the military as an avenue out of poverty.

recruitment practices and compensation schemes (see,

inequality.

the

especially poor black youth, who in the past would

the enlistment decision is from the perspective of the
military.

This positive finding, however,

gives rise to a concern that the decline in military

minorities and poor youth could be a good thing,

for example,

The analysis proceeds in three stages.

FIrSt, a simple theoretical model of the enlistment

the expected returns from enlistment against the returns

questions

concerning the distributional effects of the military,
although frequently discussed in editorials, have yet to

to the best civilian alternative.

On the demand side,

the

standards

military

attempts

to

set

that

will

maximize the quality of its enlistees subject to its

be systematically addressed in the empirical literature.

budget constraints.

For example, do black youth enter the military because

The most important screening

standards are graduation requirements and Armed

of short term economic necessity rather than for more

Forces Qualifying Test Score (AFQT) requirements.

is
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Following Antel, Hosek and Peterson (1989, pp.
210-212), a simple job-matching model is employed.
lodividual i is willing to enter into an enlistment
contract (Le. supply labor to the military) if
Vee), - V(c),

>

(1)

0

where, Vee), is the expected value of enlisting to
individual i and V(c), is the expected value of the best
civilian sector alternative to individual L
The military will be willing to enter into the
enlistment contract (Le., demand individual i) if
V(e), - V(lc),

>

0

(2)

where, V(e), is the value to the service of enlisting
individual i and V(lc), is the expected value of prospect
k who is at the margin.
10 an all volunteer force, conditions specified in
both equations I and 2 must be met before enlistment
occurs.
If the racial composition of enlistments was
primarily demand driven, equation 2 suggests that
blacks would be under represented in the armed forces.
The primary reason is that statistical criteria are often
used as proxies for V(e)" such as Armed Forces
Qualifying Test (AFQT) scores and high school
graduation requirements. Since black male youth are
less likely to graduate from high school and, on
average, score lower on AFQT tests, the eligible pool
of blacks is reduced significantly.
Despite having a smaller percentage of their male
population eligible for enlistment, blacks were still
much more likely to enlist than whites during the
1970s and 1980s.
But, in recent years, sharp
decreases in the military's demand for recruits caused
the military to become increasingly selective, and black
enlistment rates have fallen precipitously, both
absolutely and relative to white rates. For example,
when the enlistment rate of black males is defined as
the number of recruits to the total number of 18 year
old black males, we see their enlistment rate declining
from one in four in the mid-1970s to one in five in the
mid-1980s. By 1991, the black enlistment rate was
only one in ten (Hosek and Klerman, 1992). 10 terms
of Equation 2, rapid recent increases in V(lc), appears
to have had a sharp disparate effect on a large number
of black youth who would have been able to enter into
enlistment contracts only a few years earlier.
Given the restrictions in demand (equation 2) for
enlistees in recent years, we can best study the

determinants of enlistment supply (equation 1) by
examining enlistment behavior in the late 1970s
through the mid-1980s; a period where many young
persons who wanted to enter into enlistment contracts
were successful and a period where black youth were
more likely to enlist than white youth. Qualified
blacks are probably more likely to enlist than their
white counterparts because of a relatively low valuation
for the best civilian sector alternative to military
service (V(c), in equation 1.) The well-documented
employment problems facing black male youth in the
civilian sector imply that they may be more willing
than their white-male counterparts to enlist in the
military because of immediate economic concerns.
White male youth, on the other hand, who face more
favorable civilian sector alternatives would be more
likely to enlist for non-economic reasons or for long
term training and education benefits.
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSy), which is the sole data base used in this paper,
provides some support for this argument. 10 the
NLSY, data was gathered through annual in-person
interviews with 12,686 youth which began in 1979 and
continued through 1990.' The survey traces labor
market and educational outcomes in great detail,
including military service. 10 the NLSY, members of
the Active Armed Forces were asked a number of
questions regarding their reasons for enlistment,
including a question on which reason they felt was
most important in influencing their enlistment decision.
Table 1 presents the percentage distribution of
responses for males aged 18-21 who were in the Active
Armed Forces in 1979, the first year the survey was
administered. Each reason was grouped into one of
three categories, the first category groups civilian
unemployment and pay related reasons for enlisting,
the second combines two human capital related reasons
and the third includes a· number of other reasons.
Although the pattern is not extremely strong, black
enlistees are more likely than whites to indicate civilian
unemployment as the main. reason for enlistment. For
example, 10 percent of all blacks in the military
sample indicated civilian unemployment as the main
reason for enlisting compared to only 5.2 percent of
white respondents. Also, a larger percentage of black
respondents indicated that their main reason for
enlistment was to gain a "chance to better self," which
for many could be an economically based response.
These results provide week support for the implication
of the job contracting model that blacks are more likely
to enlist than whites because of less favorable
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TABLE 1. Main Reason for Enlisting in the Military by Race: Percent
of Sample Indicating Each Reason
Black

White

Sample

Sample

10.0
1.3
2.0

5.2
0.5
2.3

I. Pay and Employment
Unemployed'"

Earn More in Military
Retirement/Fringe Benefits

8.0

13.3

(Subtotal)

II. Training and Education

24.5
20.0

20.7
16.7

Job Sldlls I Training
Get Money for College

44.5

37.4

(Subtotal)

Ill. Other Reasons

10.9
9.3
3.4
6.1
1.1
3.4
13.2

16.7
10.7
2.7
2.0
0.0
4.7
12.7

Chance to Better Self*
Travel
Escape Personal Problems
Wanted to Serve Country·
Family Tradition
Prove Can Make It
Chance To Be on My Own

47.4

49.5

(Subtotal)

100.0

100.0
150

Total
Sample Size

440

Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
.. Indicates significant difference between the black sample
and white sample proportions at the .10 level.

economic opportunities in the civilian sector.

White

enlistees were more strongly influenced by longer term
training and education opportunities provided by the
military and by a patriotic desire to serve.
Although black youth appear to be more likely to
enter the military for immediate economic reasons,
there is little evidence that they have significantly
different attitudes regarding the value of military
service (V(e)J than white youth.

In 1981, when the

NLSY asked, "Do you think for a young person to
serve in the military is definitely a good thing,
probably a good thing, probably not a good thing, or
definitely not a good thing?" the pattern of response
was very similar between black and white youth.'

ill. Predicting Enlistment
A single equation logit model is employed to test two
implications of the job-matching model: 1) young men
who are living in poverty at the age of 17 will, ceteris
paribus, be more likely to enlist than their nonpoor
counterparts; and 2) young black men will be more
likely to enlist than young white men, even after
controlling for human capital and family background
differences.
There are several reasons tu expect the poor to have
a greater proclivity to enlist.

First, young men who

are living in poverty when they reach enlistment age
are

going

to

be

at

a

disadvantage

in

securing

employment in the civilian sector because they have
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fewer financial resources to conduct effective job

attainment, and scores on aptitude tests (Center for

search. Second, impoverished parents are less likely
than non-poor parents to be able to provide a great

Human Resource Research, 1993).

deal

enlistment

of useful

contacts.

job

search

information,

including

Third, poor youth may lack resources to

From

Equations

1 and 2, we know that an

contract

will be entered when the net

benefits to the potential enlistee and the military are

pursue post-secondary education in lieu of military

positive.

service. Finally, job-matching information concerning

empirical

employment opportunities in the military is more

dependent variable, allows for multiple explanatory

Logistic
model

regression

since

is

an

it assumes

a

appropriate
dichotumous

readily available to youth, regardless of socioeconomic

variables and does not suffer from some of the

status. Indeed, advertising by the Armed Forces in the

shortcomings of using OLS in the estimation of

mass media seems to be pitched toward the wants of

dichotumous outcomes (Gujarati, 1988, Chapter 15).

the economically disadvantaged and has long been the

The dependent variable (MILITARY) and independent

subject of critical social commentary (Siegel, 1991).

variables are defined in Table 2.

MILITARY is a

The second implication of the job matching model

dummy variable, where 1 represents a successful job

is that black youth should be more likely to enlist than

match between the military and the respondent. To be

white youth, even after controlling for human capital

classified as a successful job match, the indlvidual had

differentials and socioeconomic backgronnd.

tu be in the active armed forces for at least one year

One

reason for this expectation is that housing segregation

from 1979 through 1990.

and the deindustrialization of central city job markets
result in a spatial mismatch between many young black

A key explanatory variable is poverty status at age
17 (POOR).
In the NLSY, poverty status is

males and the location of entry level jobs (1hlanfeldt

determined

and Sjoquist, 1990; and Kain 1968).

definition of poverty to family income data gathered

This makes job

by

applying

the

official

government

matching in the civilian sector increasingly difficult for

during the surveys. The rationale for choosing poverty

black males, leading to a decrease in black youth

status at age 17 is that most young people begin

civilian

the

seriously assessing the benefits and costs of enlistment

that employment

at that age. Since respondents ranged in age from 14

employment rates,

incentives

to enlist.

thereby increasing

The idea

conditions affect enlistment receives support from a

to 18 in 1979, poverty status (POOR) is determined in

body of empirical work which finds enlistment to be

the year when the respondent reached 17.

responsive to changes in unemployment rates over time

There

are

three

variables

which

reflect

the

1983) and to differences in

respondent's family background (FEM-HEAD, MOM

unemployment rates across geographic areas (Brown,

HS and MOM-COL). Youth who are raised in female

(Dale

and

Gilroy,

1985).

headed"families are less likely to have frequent contact

To determine the effects of race and poverty on

with a family member with prior military experience.

enlistment, the enlistment behavior of a large sample

For these youth, the absence of a father with prior

of youth is analyzed using logistic regression.

military

The

experience

may

mean

that

information

sample, which is drawn from the National Longitudinal

regarding the value of service may be less accurate and

Survey of Youth, consists of male youth in the civilian

the parental pressure to serve for Upatriotic" reasons

population who were 14-18 years old in 1979. Since

may be less intense.

minorities and economically disadvantaged youth are

The mother's educational attainment is a common

over represented in the sample, it is well suited to the

proxy for the socioeconomic status. It is expected that

study of race and poverty effects on enlistment .

For

youth raised in families where the mother has at least

example, 27 percent of the sample were poor at age 17

some college education (MOM-COL) will be less likely

and 28 percent black.

intended to provide large enough samples of minority

to enlist. Highly educated parents are able to raise the
value of civilian sector activity for their offspring by

and economically disadvantaged groups to facilitate

being more efficient producers of human capital in the

statistical analysis of their behavior. Members of the

home and having better connections and information

sample were interviewed every year from 1979 through

concerning education and employment opportunities in

This over representation is

1990. A wealth of information
.
relevant to the

the civilian sector.

enlistment decision were collected, including poverty

The final four variables defined in Table 2 are

status, measures of family background, educational

measures of the human capital level of the respondent.
Educational attainment is important for two reasons.
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TABLE 2. Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics

Variable
MILITARY

Member of Active Armed Forces for at Least
One Year ( I

POOR

Poor; 0

0.27
Not Poor)

=

=

Black; 0

=

=

0.28

Not Black)

Ethnicity Identified
(1

FEM-HEAD

=

0.11

Nonmember)

=

Race Identified as Black
(1

HISPANIC

Member, 0

=

Poor at age 17

(I
BLACK

Mean

Definition

Hispanic; 0

as Hispanic

=

0.17

Not Hispanic)

Lived in a Female-Headed Household

0.2

at Age Fourteen
(1
MOM-HS

=

Fern Head; 0

=

Not Fern. Head)

Mother Completed Exactly twelve

0.37

Years of Education
(1
MOM-COL

=

12 Years; 0

=

otherwise)

Mother Completed More Than Twelve

0.15

Years of Education
(1
RURAL

=

more than 12 yrs.; 0

=

otherwise)

Respondent Lived in a Rural Area

0.21

at Age Fourteen
(1
SOUTH

=

Rural; 0

=

Not Rural)

Respondent Lived in the South

0.36

at Age Fourteen
(1
HS-GRAD

=

South; 0

=

Non-South)

Respondent Completed Exactly Twelve

0.41

Years of Education (1990 Interview)
(1
AFQT2

=

12 Years; 0

=

otherwise)

Respondent Scored in the Second

0.25

Quartile of AFQT for his Age Group:
1981 Survey (I
AFQT3

=

2nd; 0

=

Otherwise)

Respondent Scored in the Third

0.24

Quartile of AFQT for His Age Group:
1981 Survey (1
AFQT4

=

3rd; 0

=

Otherwise)

RespOndent Scored in the Fourth
Quartile of AFQT for His Age Group:
1981 Survey (1

=

4th; 0

=

Otherwise)

0.25
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First, it is used as a screen by the military. H igh
school dropouts are recruited only when the enlistment
quota cannot be reached without lowering standards.
Young men who have achieved education beyond the
high school diploma may also be less likely to enlist
than those with exactly 12 years of education because
they face better civilian sector opportunities. It is,
therefore, expected that those who have attained
exactly 12 years of formal education will be more
likely to enlist than those with other levels.
A direct measure of ability is included as a set of
dummy variables measuring quartile rankings on the
Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT). Since the
AFQT was administered to nearly all members of the
NLSY sample during 1980, it is a common measure of
ability for both enlistees and nonenlistees. Individuals
were assigned to quartile rankings according to their
AFQT score within their own age group. This was
necessary since individuals in the younger age groups
scored somewhat lower, on average than those who
were over 18 years old.
For example, median AFQT percentile scores for
the age groups included in our analysis is 22 for those
who were 15 when they took the test in 1980 compared
to 32 for those who were 17 when they took the test in
1980. All age groups in our sample had median scores
which were far less than a representative sample would
have because of an over representation in the NLSY of
economically disadvantaged and minority youth.
Since the military uses AFQT scores as criteria in
determining whether to offer enlistment contracts, we
would expect those in the bottom quartile to have
lower probabilities of enlisting than those in other
quartiles. Since the first quartile is omitted from the
logit model, we expect positive coefficients for the
dummy variables indicating the second, third and
fourth quartiles.
Logit regression results are presented in Table 3.
The first column of results is for the complete sample
and the last two columns are for the black sample and
Since the dependent
white sample respectively.
variable is the natural log of the odds of reaching a
successful enlistment, the coefficients can not be
interpreted in probability terms. But the signs and
significance levels of the coefficients can be interpreted
in a manner similar to OLS regression (Gujarati,
1988).
The implications of the job-matching model
regarding the effects of poverty and race are supported
by the results. The measure of poverty (POOR) is a
significant and positive predictor of enlistment

(MILITARY) in all three models, even after
controlling for human capital endowments and
background. This indicates that the effect of poverty
on enlistment is similar for both blacks and whites.
To determine the effect of poverty on the
probability of enlistment, it is necessary to make
assumptions regarding the values of the independent
variables and to solve for the probability of enlistment
using the cumulative logistic distribution function
(Gujurati, p. 4 81). For the purpose of estimation, it is
assumed that the respondent is white (BLACK=0 and
ffiSPANIC=0), lived in a female headed household at
age 14 (FEM-HEAD=l), has a mother with 12 years
of education (MOM-HS=l), lived in a northern city at
the age of 14 (RURAL=O and SOUTH=O), completed
exactly 12 years of schoal (HS-GRAD=l), and scored
in the third quartile of the AFQT exam for his age
group (AFQT3=I).
Using the estimated logit
coefficients and the cumulative logistic distribution
function, it is estimated that a poor respondent with
these characteristics will have a 5.7 percent greater
probability of enlisting than a nonpoor respondent with
these characteristics" Poverty at age 17 appears to
have been an important determinant of enlistment
during the 1980s for those who met education and
AFQT standards.
The logit regression results in Table 3 also show
blacks to be more likely to enlist than whites, even
after controlling for poverty status, human capital
endowments and background variables. Making the
same assumptions as above, it is estimated that a black
male will have a 20.2 percent higher probability of
enlisting than a similarly situated white male. This
result is consistent with the implications drawn earlier
from job-matching and spatial mismatch theory
regarding barriers that blacks face in the civilian
sector.
With the exception of poverty status at the age of 17
(POOR), other measures of socioeconomic background
(FEM-HEAD, MOM-HS, MOM-COL , RURAL and
SOUTH) are generally insignificant predictors of
enlistment. Only the dummy variable indicating that
the mother had achieved formal post-secondary
education (MOM-COL) has a significant coefficient.
As expected,
measures of human capital
endowments (HS-GRAD, AFQT2, AFQT3 and
AFQT4) have positive and very significant coefficients.
The military relies heavily on educational attainment
and AFQT scores in screening applicants. The fact
that the coefficients to these variables are of similar
magnitude in the logit equations for· both black and the
.
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TABLE 3. Logit Results: Predicting Participation in the Active
Armed Forces (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Complete
Sample

Black
Sample

White
Sample

POOR

0.47**
(0.13)

0.31*
(0.20)

0.41*
(0.21)

BLACK

0.93**

Variable

(0.14)
ffiSPANIC

0.05
(0.18)

FEM-HEAD

0.02
(0.14)

0.19
(0.20)

.{l.13
(0.26)

MOM-HS

.{l.16
(0.13)

.{l.01
(0.21)

.{l.22
(0.18)

MOM-COL

.{l.43*
(0.19)

.{l.15
(0.30)

.{l.59*
(0.26)

RURAL

0.01
(0.14)

0.13
(0.27)

0.02
(0.18)

SOUTII

0.14
(0.12)

0.25
(0.20)

0.09
(0.18)

HS-GRAD

0.59**
(0.12)

0.59**
(0.20)

0.51**
(0.17)

AFQT2

1.55**

1.75**

1.07*

(0.20)

(0.26)

(0.44)

AFQT3

2.12**
(0.21)

2.09**
(0.30)

2.00**
(0.42)

AFQT4

2.14**
(0.23)

2.26**
(0.39)

1.99*·
(0.42)

CONSTANT

-4.30**
(0.24)

-3.98**
(0.42)

-3.61**
(0.33)

-2 log likelihood
Chi-Square
N

2231.4
196.6
3423

. 741.7
86.9
950

1156.9
63.1
1890

* Statistically significant at the .05 level
** Statistically significant at the .01 level
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white samples, as shown in the last two columns of
Table 3, provides some evidence that AFQT standards
are being applied in a similar way to blacks and
whites.

IV. Enlistment and Poverty Transitions
The preceding section showed that impoverished youth
in the NLSY sample were more likely to enlist than
similarly endowed nonpoor youth. How effective has
the military been as an "anti-poverty program" during
the 1980s1 The NLSY sample is especially well suited
to address this question since most enlistees in the
sample enlisted early in the decade and completed their
military service well before the 1990 survey.
Table 4 presents poverty rates and poverty
transitions for three groups of males: the military
sample, a control group and high school dropouts.
The military sample consists of all 14-18 year old
males in 1979 who were in the active armed forces for
at least one year between 1979 and 1990 and
responded to the 1990 interview.
The control group includes individuals who have not
served in the military but have similar human capital
endowments as the military sample, namely, male
respondents with 12 through 14 years of education and
AFQT scores between the 10th and 90th percentile
scores of the military sample (i.e., AFQT scores from
13 through 72).
Initial poverty rates for all three groups are
measured for the year when the individual was 17.
Table 4 shows that poverty rates at the age of 17 are
43.8 percent for the black military sample and 17.8
percent for the white military sample. By 1989, the
poverty rates of the military sample had fallen sharply
to 9.5 percent for blacks and 4.8 percent for whites.
The control group also realized significant declines in
poverty rates, but not nearly as pronounced as for the
military sample. On the other hand, the decline in
poverty rates for the high school dropouts is moderate,
especially for blacks.
The poverty rates presented in Table 4 indicate that
the military may have exerted a significant positive
influence on the poverty status of young males,
especially young black males. For black males, the
military seems to have been' especially effective in
preventing youth who were not living with poor
families when they were 17 from slipping into poverty
in 1989. Human capital endowments, however, are
also important. The military sample and the control
group both compared favorably in terms of transitions

out of poverty compared to high school dropouts, a
group which is almost always ineligible for military
service.
The mechanisms that lead to successful transitions
from poverty for members of the military is not well
understood and would be a fruitful area of future
research. One study suggests that military skills may
be more transferrable to the civilian sector than is
commonly believed (Mangum and Ball, 1989). Other
possibilities are that behavioral traits required and
developed in the military (e.g., discipline and loyalty)
are also traits which are rewarded in the civilian
sector. To the extent that certain unmeasured attitudes
are important, it could be that those who choose to
enlist are fundamentally different than those in the
control group and would have been more likely to
succeed even without having had the opportunity to
serve. It seems most probable that a combination of
these factors are at work.

v. Conclusions
The enlistment regressions show the military to be
attractive compared to civilian alternatives for
minorities and economically disadvantaged youth
during the early 198Os. But, the situation began to
change during the mid-1980s. Stesdily increasing
qualification standards since about 1982 and sharply
declining enlistment quotas during the 1990s have had
a disparate effect on the enlistment of minorities and
the poor (Berryman, 1990; Farris, 1992; Fernandez,
1989; Hosek and K1erman, 1992). While enlistment
rates of black-males was about twice that of white
males during the early 19808, today enlistment rates of
blacks and whites are about the same.
While this will certainly yield a more representative
military force in the 1990s, it will also reduce the
military's role as an "antipoverty program."
Despite the success of the military in reducing
poverty among high school graduates, it was not of
much help to high school dropouts.
So, as an
antipoverty tool, the military can only be effective in
improving the economic condition of the most
favorably endowed youth in terms of education and
abilities. The "truly disadvantaged" members of what
is often referred to as the "underclass" (Wilson, 1987)
are largely beyond its reach.
One thing is certain.
Because of reduction in
enlistment opportunities, young black males are going
to face even more competitive markets in the civilian
sector. During the 1980s the military absorbed a very
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TABLE 4. Poverty Rates and Transitions for Three Groups

Black

White

Black

White

Black

White

105

146

151

591

105

256

43.8

17.8

35.8

14.9

57.1

38.3

9.5

4.8

13.2

6.6

44.8

22.3

84.4

100.0

92.6

80.7

Sample Size
Percent Poor at

HS Dropouts

Control Group

Military Sample

Age 17
Percent Poor in

1989
% of Poor Who

50.0

74.5

Moved Out of
Pov. by 1989

% of Nonpoor

5.8

5.0

4.4

16.5

20.3

37.8

Who Moved Into
Pov. by 1989

large percentage of black youth.

tape or CD ROM (Center for Human Resource Research,

This is no longer

happening. If the demand for minority youth does not
increase in the civilian sector, we should expect

1992).
3.

The distribution of responses fur black and white males in
the 1981 survey to the question "do you think for a young

continued high minority unemployment rates, further

person to serve in the military is definitely a good thing,

decreases in minority youth employment to population

probably a good thing, probably not a good thing, or

ratios, increased pressures on public social services and

definitely not a good thing?' are as follows:

growth in the prison population.

definitely a

good thing (17.3 percent of blacks v. 13.7 percent of

economically

whites); probably a good thing (62.0 percent of blacks v.

disadvantaged youth, there may be some lessons to be

65.8 percent of whites); probably not a good thing (13.0

In

designing

new

programs

learned from the military.

for

percent of blacks v. 15.1 percent of whites); definitely not

Programs which combine

a good thing (7.7 percent of blacks v. 5.4 percent of

work experience, discipline and training may be the

whites).

most effective way of remedying the very difficult
situation faced by our economically disadvantaged
youth.

The sample includes 845 black males and 1733

white males who were 16 through 20 years old in 1981.
4.

For a description of the logit model, see Gujarati, pp. 481491. The cumulative logistic distribution function used to
calculate probabilities is:
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